Evidence index
The files and endpoints the checking pages rely on, with each address, byte size and SHA-256 written out in the text of this page. Some browsing tools cannot open raw program or data files, so nothing here needs them opened.
Sizes and hashes were computed from the files in our repository on 22 October 2026 by an AI agent working to the author's instruction. No person has audited them. To check one yourself, download the file and run sha256sum on it. A matching hash shows you hold the same bytes as the ones listed here. It does not show the program is correct.
A second copy of this index is kept on a different site that we also run: https://agenticgovernance.digital/evidence. It is a second copy, not a separate source.
Files served from this site
Each is a file you can download. A line for each file sets out what a successful check shows and what it does not show. The hash beside a .sha256 file is the hash of that small file itself.
| Address | Bytes | SHA-256 hash | What a successful check shows | What a successful check does not show |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/verify-record.js | 181221 | c90ced27a9400a9efeeddece0dcb0fb9a70ddbe4ab8e7d16129890e361a14bb2 | The record file you give it hashes and verifies as it claims: content hashes match, each signature checks against the key carried in the record, linked entries chain, and any time token checks. | It does not show who issued the record file, unless you fix the signer's key fingerprint in advance or supply a trust anchor. It does not show that nothing was removed from the end of a chain, and it checks no revocation. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/provenance-verifier.js | 362461 | eff7425271fd4ff57ac0d27e6e05944de7292c9297edde4396e239f53128618f | A Provenance dossier parses strictly, each signature checks against the key in the copy of that party's DID document that travels in the dossier and against the key fingerprint you fix for that party, the sequence numbers, daily fingerprints and inclusion proofs line up for each party, handovers between parties match, and the lot graph recomputes. The result says which of these it could and could not check. | That the goods match the records, that any party told the truth, or that the checker itself is correct. A key you have not pinned is reported as such. No outside reproduction of its cryptography has been done. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/provenance-verifier.js.sha256 | 89 | 133419710a7b90df15a7eb061ce84666d1802f57180eba42ad3f776f759c5a20 | The published hash of the checker, for comparison. A match shows a copy you hold is the copy this site serves. | Nothing by itself: it is served beside the file it describes, so it detects a damaged copy, not a replaced site. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/email-decision-record-verifier.js | 185606 | e466a1a61b5088efeacec2097820805979196f5998bcf17c227a542a5f40926c | An Email Decision Record dossier's receipts are unchanged since signing, each signature checks against the key it names, the chain and the inclusion proofs hold, and any RFC 3161 time-stamp token passes the check against a bundled authority root. The result states what it did not examine. | Who wrote an email: a login or API key is recorded, not the author of the text. It consults no certificate revocation list, so a revoked time-stamp certificate is not detected. A key you have not pinned is reported as such. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/email-decision-record-verifier.js.sha256 | 100 | fa757522e901cf8d91a85692ee11f5bd9f08e1b8c35abe3a651d15be679cc831 | The published hash of the checker, for comparison. A match shows a copy you hold is the copy this site serves. | Nothing by itself: it is served beside the file it describes, so it detects a damaged copy, not a replaced site. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/consignment-verifier.js | 56493 | 151ef62443703208f75cf5c9a569542a46eaf3f890f3385629bc4c3374615c16 | A consignment file's Provenance record and Email Decision Record each pass their own pinned checker, and a signed email names the lot reference. | Anything about what else went with that email, or that any record is complete or any rule is met. A key you have not pinned is reported as such. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/consignment-verifier.js.sha256 | 90 | 7eda22fcd64b85da731c1261c52aadeccdc1910c24e7f804e0ad88a25680efdf | The published hash of the checker, for comparison. A match shows a copy you hold is the copy this site serves. | Nothing by itself: it is served beside the file it describes, so it detects a damaged copy, not a replaced site. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/consignment-verifier-v2.js | 68909 | 1ffb7fa4d51ea61af3cd02ce3e6c82dc9b5b57ce5892dcd8f962f852697597c5 | The same as the checker above for a version 1 consignment file, and for a version 2 file also that the invoice member passes its own pinned checker, and whether the invoice names the same lot as the Provenance record. A key you have not pinned is reported as such, never as verified. | A successful check says nothing about whether the invoice is true, whether its figures match the goods or whether the file is complete. The invoice also carries no sealed daily fingerprint and no outside time stamp of its own. Nobody has audited this checker. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/consignment-verifier-v2.js.sha256 | 93 | e7a45e6bb64f33ab7ee06c85aca23918abd18dfa4edaf0a4b861a8be28257054 | The published hash of the checker, for comparison. A match shows a copy you hold is the copy this site serves. | Nothing by itself: it is served beside the file it describes, so it detects a damaged copy, not a replaced site. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/invoice-bundle-verifier.js | 23254 | 96ac2ac454da385d1f0b93ed2040e2bbb1959973135af57820161ad64da5111f | An invoice record that shows only a chosen few fields (lot reference, quantity, unit, currency, total, date) hashes and verifies as sealed, and the hidden fields have not been changed. Run with --pin DID=sha256-of-the-signer's-key to tie it to a key you hold; without a key fingerprint fixed in advance, key_not_pinned is returned. | What the hidden fields say, who holds the signing key, or that the invoice is correct. It runs verify-record.js beside it and refuses to run if that file is not the build it knows. |
| mysovereignty.digital/downloads/invoice-bundle-verifier.js.sha256 | 93 | 82291168a24c92bc7de2168a54ae9c973c16f1415f28f84667efd40d7bc950fe | The published hash of the checker, for comparison. A match shows a copy you hold is the copy this site serves. | Nothing by itself: it is served beside the file it describes, so it detects a damaged copy, not a replaced site. |
The checker for a single record, verify-record.js, has no .sha256 file; its hash is in the table above. The consignment checker runs the Provenance and Email Decision Record checkers only if their bytes match the SHA-256 it has pinned, which are the two values listed above.
Signing identity (DID)
| Address | Key id | Type of key | Key fingerprint | What it shows when the fingerprint matches | What it does not show when the fingerprint matches |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| stroh.myfamilyhistory.digital/.well-known/did.json | #pq-1 | JsonWebKey, kty AKP, alg ML-DSA-65 | The first 16 hex characters of the SHA-256 of the decoded public key (1952 bytes), read from the live page on 22 October 2026: f0d6bef7de540b4c | That a key in a record is the one the tenant's DID document lists today. | That the key was not swapped before you looked, or that the signing scheme will stay sound. The page lists other keys too; this row covers only #pq-1. |
Estate root endpoints
The estate root is the daily root hash over the Email Decision Record. It carries one witness signature, made by our own server in New Zealand, which is operated by us and is not independent of us. Two outside time-stamping authorities stamp each day's root hash: Certum (Poland) and Portugal's Cartão de Cidadão authority. Both addresses below answered with HTTP 200 on 22 October 2026.
| Address | What it returns | What a successful check shows | What a successful check does not show |
|---|---|---|---|
| mysovereignty.digital/api/email-decision-record/estate-root/latest | The most recent day's root hash, its signature and the witness signature. The outside time stamps are on the index. | With the signature checked against the signing key: that this root hash is the one our key signed, and that our own witness server recorded seeing it. | That the records under the root hash are complete or true. The witness is our own server, so it adds no outside check. |
| mysovereignty.digital/api/email-decision-record/estate-root/index | The list of days for which a root hash exists, each with the time stamps issued over it by Certum (Poland) and by Portugal's Cartão de Cidadão authority. | Which days are claimed to have a root hash, and which time stamps we hold for each. | That a day missing from the list was never sealed, that a day on the list has not been changed since it was sealed, or that a stamp is valid until its token has been checked. |
Limits that apply to all of it
- No person has audited anything on this page. AI agents built the programs and reviewed them.
- The hashes come from our own repository. They are our own statement, not an outside check, until you compute them from the bytes you fetched.
- A matching hash shows you hold the bytes listed here. It does not show the program is correct, and publishing a program's source, test vectors or hash does not make its cryptography verified.
- The witness is our own server, and the signing keys for most Villages are held by My Digital Sovereignty Ltd.
- A fetch that fails in your tool is a limit of the tool, not necessarily an error at our end. Say which you saw.
Direction and continuity
Our stated intention is to move what we have built towards open source, in stages: the checking programs and standards first, then the substrate, then the Governance API. The reason is continuity. A record that has to stay checkable for years should not depend on one company, one founder or an escrow agreement. Code that others can run and inspect removes the succession question and the source-escrow question together. What we sell is the running of it: hosting in New Zealand and the EU, key custody, assurance, support and continuity. Nothing has been released, no date is set and no licence is fixed.
Our direction is a hybrid design: business records stay on infrastructure under New Zealand or EU control, and only fingerprints are committed to an outside network. The network we are testing against is Midnight. Today that is a test-network attestation contract using test data, which records that our own checker accepted a proof. There is no production anchoring and no partnership.
Who made it
Built by AI agents under John Stroh's direction, and reviewed by AI agents.
No person has audited this software.
Publisher: My Digital Sovereignty Ltd, Amberley, New Zealand.